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Rethinking global governance: a China model in the making?
Lai-Ha Chana, Pak K. Leeb and Gerald Chanc
aGriffith Asia Institute, Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia; bDepartment of Politics and International
Relations, University of Kent, Canterbury, UK; cSchool of Government and International Affairs,
University of Durham, Durham, UK
This paper examines Chinese perspectives on global governance, an area in which China has
increased substantially the depth and breadth of its participation. The paper attempts to draw a
mainstream perspective to inform our understanding of some key aspects of China’s foreign
policy. It demonstrates that while China’s statist preference appeals to some Third World
countries, such a preference leads the country to clash with the West over how to tackle
global issues collectively, particularly over humanitarian intervention. While the Chinese per-
spective is in the process of evolving and far from reaching maturity, it is questionable
whether the global community led by the West would find the Westphalian practice that
China embraces admirable.
Keywords: Beijing consensus/China model; global governance; good governance; sover-
eignty; humanitarian intervention
In the processes of global governance . . . [states] are very central indeed.
Rosenau (2005, p. 62)
Global governance is not democratically legitimate.
Scholte (2005, p. 331)
There is little dispute that China has increasingly integrated itself into the international system
and that China has remarkably increased its presence in various international organizations and
regimes. At the same time, the doctrine of understanding global politics in the West has been
transformed from state-centric international politics to the notion of ‘global governance’ and
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from ‘non-intervention’ to ‘humanitarian intervention’ while stressing the importance of ‘good
governance’ in development. As a rising power and the most populous developing state, does
China have a national blueprint for its participation in global governance? Will China adapt
to the West’s changing conceptualization of global governance or will it construct and
promote its own philosophy of development?
The emergence of the ‘China threat’ arguments since the early 1990s, theAsian financial crisis of
1997–8 and the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2002–3have all had linger-
ing impacts on China’s foreign policy. China’s policymaking elites and their think-tank advisers see
theneed toexpressChina’soverall thinkingabout its roles inglobal affairs. In addition, since thebegin-
ning of this century, they have discussed the possible impacts China can make on the global commu-
nity.A critical first step towards gaugingChina’s participation in global governance in the twenty-first
century would be to gain a better understanding of how it interprets the concept of global governance.
This paper therefore aims at examining how the Chinese conceptualize global governance and the
associated concept of good governance in a globalizing polity so as to provide a context against
which China watchers can assess China’s participation in various issue areas of global governance.
The paper consists of four sections. Against a rapidly expanding literature in the West about
the changing role of the state, the reconceptualization of national sovereignty, and the rise of the
paradigm of good governance, Section 1 lays out the Chinese mainstream perspective on these
three issues. The second section explains how China comes to such a conception of global
governance. Section 3 shifts the focus from perspective to praxis through an examination of
how China applies its thinking to real-world politics. Emphasis is placed on the issue of the
‘Washington Consensus’ versus the ‘Beijing Consensus’ and on the more recent notion of a
‘harmonious world’. Section 4 concludes by exploring the implications of such Chinese perspec-
tive for China’s external behaviour as well as its relations with the West.
Chinese perspectives on global governance
Using ‘quanqiu zhili’ global governance) as a keyword to look for articles from
the database known as ‘China Academic Journals Full-text Database: Economics, Politics and
Law’ the search reveals that
between 1979 and 2006, a total of 342 articles were published, of which more than 96%
were in 2000 and after. In other words, the subject of global governance has only entered the
Chinese discourse for a few years. In the West, in contrast, a vast amount of literature on the
subject has been generated since the early 1990s.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to go to great lengths to discuss the Western understand-
ing of global governance (see, e.g., Camilleri and Falk 1992, Rosenau and Czempiel 1992, Falk
1995, Held et al. 1999, Held and McGrew 2002a, 2002b). Suffice it to say that the concept
emerged in contemporary times against the background of the collapse of the Bretton Woods
system of fixed exchange rates, a growing awareness of the global nature of environmental
degradation and the debt crisis of developing nations in the 1980s (Sinclair 2005). Admitting
the futility of individual states to resolve the transnational issues on its own, the proponents
of global governance call for a broadened participation of actors in regulating and managing
global issues and problems. Not only is the relative role of the state under transformation, its
foundations are shaken as a result of a series of atrocities against humanity by state actors in
Africa, the Balkans and Southeast Asia in the 1990s. These tragedies have led to cries for
reconceptualizing national sovereignty. The age-old principle of non-intervention in the internal
affairs of states is no longer regarded as sacrosanct. Sovereignty is reinterpreted as the respon-
sibility to protect people and their property and reoriented around people as well as states
(Annan 1999, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001). As a


































corollary, the dichotomy between ‘global’ and ‘domestic’ issues has become blurred. An
increasing number of problems are considered to have transnational impacts and hence on the
agenda of global governance. The growing Third World debt crisis of the 1980s, which triggered
a call for global governance, prompted international financial institutions to examine the struc-
tural factors that held back sub-Saharan African countries from successfully implementing
market-friendly reforms. A solution advocated by the Washington-dominated financial
institutions and donor governments is good governance. Since the end of the Cold War, the
political conditionality of good governance has often been imposed on developing countries
seeking financial assistance (see Smith 2007 for a comprehensive discussion). We shall return
shortly to these three key issues: the changing role of the state in global governance; the
changing nature of sovereignty; and the prominence given to the paradigm of good governance.
The evolution of Chinese perspectives on global governance has come under the influence of a
‘new security concept’ advocated by Chinese leaders since 1996 when China presented a report to
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Inter-sessional Support Group on Confidence-building
Measures in Tokyo in January 1996.WithAmerican hegemony as its implicit target, the new secur-
ity concept calls for using cooperative means to deal with security issues without diluting its state-
centric version of international relations (Yahuda 2005). It stresses the importance of ‘common
security’ as well as multilateral approach to manage security threats. With this new security
concept, China began to demonstrate a preference for a multilateral approach to participating in
international affairs and for taking an active part in international forums involving various intergo-
vernmental organizations (IGOs) and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). To
put flesh on the bones of this new concept, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a
Position Paper on Enhanced Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues in 2002
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC 2002). The discourse of global governance among
Chinese scholars has started to flourish since the dawn of this century.
Key figures in the study of globalization and global governance in China include Cai Tuo,
Yu Zhengliang, Wang Yizhou and Yu Keping. The former three distinguish themselves from
their colleagues in the country by sharing a globalist (quanqiu zhuyi) approach by virtue of
their embrace of idealism, liberalism and non-statism (Dan 2006). In the first Chinese article
that addresses the issue of global governance squarely, Cai Tuo, Director of the Research
Centre on Globalization and Global Problems at China University of Political Science and
Law, defines global governance as:
A set of new regulations, mechanisms, methods and activities for the administration of the public
affairs of man, with the doctrine of holism of mankind and its common interest as the value
orientation, and with dialogues, consultations and cooperation on equal footings among multiple
actors as the approach so as to deal with global changes as well as global problems and challenges
facing the contemporary world (Cai 2004b, p. 57).
A brief discussion of this definition reveals some interesting Chinese understandings of the
concept of global governance. The term ‘administration of the public affairs of man’ refers
apparently to the subject matter of practical politics. (Man [ren lei] here presumably means
humankind, including both genders.) The ‘doctrine of holism’ derives from some Chinese
philosophical appreciation of comprehensiveness of and balance in nature. It is interesting to
point out that approaches such as ‘dialogues, consultations and cooperation’ are suggested,
which tie in well with China’s diplomatic approach these days to resolve international problems
through peaceful means, and is in tune with the desire for the development of a peaceful environ-
ment, both international and domestic, for its modernization to proceed smoothly. Furthermore,
Cai (2004a) envisages five trends of global governance:



































2. from state to society;
3. from territorial politics to non-territorial politics;
4. from an administration that is coercive and hierarchical to one that is based on equality,
consultation, voluntariness and network; and
5. global governance as a special political authority.
The first three refer to the growing prominence of non-governmental actors, including civil
society organizations and multinational corporations (MNCs), in global politics and their
cross-border activities in what James Rosenau regards as ‘spheres of authority’. The fourth
transformation signifies the activity of making collective decisions by a multitude of actors
through non-hierarchical negotiations and agreements. As a result of the fourth factor, global
governance has its own special political authority which would undermine the authority of
the state but have yet to completely deprive it of authority. It seems that China is adjusting incre-
mentally to these trends, with some people moving more readily than others. For example, those
working in the theoretical domain of politics and international relations are more flexible and
liberal than those working in the practical domain. Similar to the Western conceptions of
global governance, Cai (2004b, p. 66) emphasizes the significance of compliance with global
norms. He says that ‘to meet the challenges [of governing global problems], norms and
mechanisms acceptable to all nations have to be created through dialogues, consultations and
cooperation, to be followed by coordinated joint actions.’
Yu Zhengliang and his associates in Shanghai have coined the complex notions of ‘global
co-governance’ (quanqiu gongzhi) and state co-governance (guojia gongzhi). In the former, a
wide array of actors, not restricted to nation-states, manage issues of common concern in
multilateral institutions and international treaties. To achieve this goal, state co-governance is
the primary form of governance. Amounting in practice to no more than inter-state multilateral
cooperation, state co-governance is to be accomplished by multilateral institutions, which have
to be reformed in ‘democratic’ ways, with great powers assuming principal responsibilities for
institutional redesign (Yu et al. 2005).
Influenced by Anthony McGrew of the University of Southampton, UK, Yu Keping
(2002, 2006a, pp. 87–88), Deputy Director of the CCP Central Bureau of Translation, refers
global governance to the legally binding international regimes used to resolve global issues
such as military or non-military security threats so as to maintain a proper international political
and economic order. SunKuanping and Teng Shihua (2003), currently of the CCPCentral Bureau
of Translation and East China University of Political Science and Law respectively, are of the
view that global governance is characterized by four defining features, namely: involvement of
multiple actors; participation, cooperation and consultation based on widely accepted regimes;
commitment to resolving common human problems; and compliance with institutions and
rules on the basis of a common set of values. Thus the focus of global governance is seen to be
moving from the government to the non-governmental sector, and from the state to society.
When Cai, Sun and Teng refer to ‘on equal footings among multiple actors’ and ‘involve-
ment of multiple actors’, do they imply that the Chinese approach to international relations is
moving away from a state-centric focus? The following sections try to analyse the Chinese
perspective from the three aforementioned aspects by focusing on to what extent China has
learned from the West and subsequently modified its understanding of global governance.
A diminished role of the nation-state in global governance?
According to Cai (2004a, 2004b), China’s vision of global governance differs from that of the
West in several ways. First, due to its rising and yet limited power in global politics, China tends


































to take a prudent and low-profile position in international affairs and work within the established
frameworks of international organizations and multilateralism. This view is echoed by Yang
Jiemian (2005) of the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, who agrees that the Chinese
government should adopt a prudent attitude towards global governance because of the thorny
issues of a likely infringement on national sovereignty and on the traditional role of the state.
While admitting that it is in China’s national interests to participate actively in global
governance, Cai (2004b, p. 59) argues that since Chinese participation has been ‘in the name
either of the government or of the state’, so for China there is little difference between global
governance and international governance. He points out that developing countries, being
relatively novices in the architecture of global governance, are apprehensive of both Western
developed nations and global civil society because of the challenges they pose to the state as
well as national sovereignty. Using the Kurds as an example, Wang Yizhou (2000) of the Insti-
tute of World Economics and Politics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences argues that a
nation without the capability to establish a corresponding sovereign state is unable to secure
itself from foreign encroachment and intrusion. This national concern with foreign coercion
and intervention conjures up to the calamitous situation that China had experienced at the
hands of foreign powers for more than a hundred years from 1839 until the end of the Second
World War (we will return to this point later) and the problematic control over ethnic minorities
at its periphery, let alone the unresolved issue of Taiwan. For the Chinese leadership, contem-
porary China has to deal with the twin demands for state building and economic development.
Hence, the state is required to play a leading role in global governance, particularly in the light of
the nascent development of domestic NGOs. Implicit in this approach is the understanding that
all non-state actors have to rally around and co-ordinate themselves with the state, so as to keep
foreign forces at bay. For Cai (2004a, 2004b), it is more rational to view the state-NGO relations
as mutually cooperative and complementary than conflicting.
Yu Keping (2002) also emphasizes that international organizations, global civil society as
well as international regimes and regulatory mechanisms are often subject to enormous influence
and even manipulation by the powerful West led by the US. Developed states tend to use their
influence to impede effective global governance. He warns against any move that would infringe
on national sovereignty and undermine the role of nation-states in domestic and global govern-
ance. This view is echoed by Liu Jinyuan (2005) of Nanjing University who says that powerful
states have dominated and shaped the conduct of international institutions for promoting their
own foreign policy agendas. He calls on developing states to ally themselves to stave off a
monopoly on governing international institutions by the powerful states.
The demise of the Westphalian notion of national sovereignty?
The foregoing survey of the Chinese discourse on global governance indicates that the sovereign
state still plays a paramount role in the Chinese thinking. But in its deepening engagement with
global institutions, has China undergone a reconceptualization of the notion of sovereignty?
More importantly, how has China responded to the United Nations efforts to redefine
sovereignty as responsibility?
Allen Carlson (2004, 2005) argues that China conceptualizes sovereignty as a bundle of
rights, which are pursued unevenly in the country. China’s desire to boost its domestic economic
development and to enhance the legitimacy of the communist regime as well as its growing
interest in portraying itself as a responsible state have pushed China to modify its stance on
economic sovereignty and human rights intervention. However, China is not to be budged on
such territorial and jurisdictional issues as the questions of Taiwan and Tibet. Overall, he



































Bates Gill (2007) also shows China’s increased flexibility and pragmatism in its changing
approach to sovereignty, peacekeeping and antiterrorism.
Chinese scholars in the country tend to ‘unbundle’ national sovereignty into two broad
categories regarding economic and trade matters on the one hand, and political and security
issues on the other. Chu Shulong (2001), Director of the Institute of Strategic Studies at
Tsinghua University, has stated that if China wants to integrate into the international community
and benefit from that integration and globalization, ‘China has had to give up some of its sovereign
rights’. A typical example is its membership of theWorld Trade Organization (WTO). In order to
benefit from its membership, China not only has to adhere to the rules of the organization but also
needs to rewrite some of its domestic regulations in order to fit in with the organization’s require-
ments. Su Changhe (2005) of Shanghai International Studies University argues that the increased
need to address global public issues whose resolution requires global cooperative action pushes
China into acceptingmultilateralism and international regimes. In the engagement process, China
has modified its exclusive view of national sovereignty. Although he does not elaborate on the
change, he refutes the allegation that China is the staunchest fortress of the Westphalian world
order. Liu Dongguo (2005) of Renmin University of China holds that the demand for global gov-
ernance is in conflict with the prevailing world order. To establish global governance, new ideas
have to be constructed. The first step to establishing a new world order is to reform the age-old
doctrine of national sovereignty and to allow the participation of an extensive array of non-
state actors. However, Liu does not seem to have dwelt at length onwhether and how the construc-
tion of new ideas about global governance is to be undertaken in China.
In his discussion about the relationship between infectious diseases and non-traditional
security issues, Wang Yizhou (2003) points out that it would be sensible to adopt a flexible
approach to understand the meaning of sovereignty in the age of globalization. While the
traditional concept of security needs to be enriched, the notion of sovereignty also needs to be
enhanced as well. The traditional notion of sovereignty proclaims the centrality of the
principle of non-intervention in internal affairs without considering that the authority of a state
is derived from the consent of its citizens. Therefore, the concept of sovereignty should be under-
stood at two different levels. First, domestically it should be bound to the obligation of protecting
human rights of the local populace. Failure to respect, defend and promote human rights within
one’s territory would call into question the legitimacy of the state. This position is closer than
those of many Chinese analysts to the UN notion of ‘responsibility to protect’. However, at
the external level, particularly regarding inter-state relationships, Wang contends that China
needs to maintain a defensive approach, according to which the principle of non-intervention
still ‘remains the foundation stone of the world politics’. While taking a ‘progressive’ approach,
Wang (2000, 2006) warns that China needs to be mindful of the dangers of the erroneous idea that
human rights can ‘replace sovereignty’ or that ‘human rights matter more than sovereignty’.
The Chinese government in general accepts the principle of humanitarianism, but it is
adamantly opposed to interventionism. In preparing its report on humanitarian intervention,
later known as The Responsibility to Protect, the International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty (ICISS) held a number of roundtable consultations around the world.
According to Ramesh Thakur (2006, pp. 268–269), a member of the ICISS, the strongest
opposition against intervention was made by the Chinese in the Beijing consultation in June
2001. China’s apprehension about the norm of ‘responsibility to protect’ is more evident in a
Position Paper on the United Nations Reforms released by the Chinese government in June
2005. China maintains that the reforms should safeguard the principles of sovereign equality
and non-interference in internal affairs. Even if a massive humanitarian crisis takes place, it
says that the opinions of the country in question and the regional organizations concerned
should be respected, and that it is eventually the responsibility of ‘the Security Council to


































make the decision [to ease and defuse the crisis] in the frame [sic] of [the] UN in light of specific
circumstances’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC 2005). In other words, interventions
must be authorized by the Security Council and must not be unilaterally hijacked by great
powers, notably the US. Humanitarian intervention is also viewed with much suspicion in the
Chinese scholarly community. A Chinese survey of the national literature on the study of
national sovereignty in the period 1995–2005 makes little mention of the notion of ‘responsi-
bility to protect’. Neither is the background to the emergence of the new norm of humanitarian
intervention given much attention (Wang 2006). Qian Wenrong (2005) of Xinhua Center for
World Affairs Studies gives a critical review of the notion and rejects it as a new global
norm. Gao Feng (2001) of the editorial board of the Chinese Yearbook of International Law
takes issue with the proponents of humanitarian intervention over the double standard of inter-
vention. He concludes that global governance would be possible only if the principle of sover-
eign equality is closely observed.
In spite of the evolution of a new thinking of sovereignty in economicmatters, theWestphalian
understanding of sovereignty still weights heavily in theChinese official view, particularly in regard
to the strategic issue of national security which would threaten the survival of the Communist
regime and pose dangerous precedents for Tibet and Taiwan. In addition, common to the
Chinese studies under review is an argument that power in the existing international order lies
largely in the hands of the Western states, particularly the most powerful ones, for the major
extant IGOs are the creation of Western states, with the rules of the games or institutions serving
their national interests and favouring Western values. Wary of the intervention by major
powers through IGOs in the pretext of sustaining global governance, China is opposed to the
idea of the ‘pooling of sovereignty’. Sun and Yu (2004) argue that the United Nations should
shoulder the principal responsibility of global governance, even though in the short run it is
still subject to the manipulation by the US-led Western powers. That is why they paradoxically
call for an inclusion of non-state actors in the practice of global governance and for giving devel-
oping countries a stronger voice in the decision-making process of international organizations.
Since the 1990s, Chinese external behaviour has largely reflected these theoretical concerns
about global governance. On the one hand, China has embraced multilateralism and global
governance and abided by international norms and rules in various issues. For instance, China
proactively founded the Shanghai Five in 1996 and the succeeding Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) in 2001 and the Boao Forum of Asia in 2001. In January 2004 a permanent
secretariat of the SCO was set up in Beijing with Zhang Deguang, a former Chinese ambassador
to Russia, serving as the first secretary-general (Chung 2006). China approved the Kyoto
Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in 2002 whereas the US was
reluctant to commit itself to it. In the economic arena, since joining the WTO in 2001, China
has steadfastly reformed its domestic trading system, making it more compatible with WTO
rules and norms. Although some commentators have cast doubts over China’s compliance
record, particularly in the areas of intellectual property rights and market access, China has
demonstrated a strong will to adhere to the rules of the game by enacting and amending
legislation and regulations with the aim of setting up a legal system that is compatible with
the WTO.
On the other hand, Beijing has expressed deep concerns about humanitarian interventions
and about the alleged quest for global hegemony by the United States, as shown in its reactions
to the Kosovo crisis. Zhang Yunling (2000, p. 117) of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
in Beijing revealed that China was worried that ‘what happened yesterday in Yugoslavia could
occur tomorrow in Asia, especially in China, whose minority and human rights policies are
always criticized by the United States and its allies’. The Chinese were annoyed not only by



































1999, but also by the fact that without an authorization of the UN Security Council, the US-led
NATO used armed forces against the former Yugoslavia, a sovereign state which was not a
member of the regional organization and posed no direct threat to it. To counter American influ-
ence, China has reiterated its new security concept and called for remedying the damaged credi-
bility of the UN Security Council. When the UN and major stakeholder states were debating how
to respond to the outbreak of political violence in East Timor in the wake of a referendum on
deciding the relations of East Timor with Indonesia in late August 1999, China (and Russia)
stressed the need for the consent of the Indonesian government – although Indonesia’s claim
to sovereignty over East Timor and its occupation of it in 1975 were not recognized by the
UN and many of its member states – and a mandate from the Security Council. Both conditions
were fulfilled in mid-September 1999 (Martin 2003).
China embracing good-governance practices?
In stark contrast to the considerable discussion about the role of the state and national
sovereignty in globalization, only a small number of Chinese globalization specialists have
introduced the notion of good governance (shanzhi) to their audience in the country.
Yu Keping (2006a, pp. 77–86) is one of them. Both the Asian financial crisis of 1997–8 and
the following SARS outbreak of 2002–3 posed a difficult dilemma for China’s foreign
policy. On the one hand, it had to maintain economic growth by deepening its economic ties
with the world; on the other, it had to heed the call for good governance in the international
community. It faced an uphill battle to avoid being seen as an existential threat to human
lives and to the economic growth of itself as well as that of the world in its bid to shore up
its internal and external legitimacy. China has made strenuous efforts to improve both the trans-
parency of its public policy making and implementation and the availability of information on
the policy to stakeholders in response to external demands for good governance. Even so, it does
not align itself with the West in attaching the political conditionality of good governance to its
commercial deals and its financial assistance to less developed countries, particularly those in
Asia and Africa which have notorious human-rights records. In defending itself from widespread
criticisms of its ‘no-strings-attached’ policy, Beijing advises some members of the international
community against interfering in the internal affairs of others.
Constructing the Chinese perspectives
Why and how does China come to have such preferences and interests about global governance
and good governance, and what would be the possible impact on the world order? The central
focus is on why China behaves according to the dictates of realpolitik. Why is the doctrine of
sovereignty enshrined in China’s worldview? Why does China consider them as prescriptive
guiding rules for a peaceful international order?
Social learning theory asserts that an actor learns new norms and practices in its interactions
with other actors. The learning process involves the questioning of previous beliefs, the recon-
ceptualization of the problems and the articulation of new goals. World order in China’s imperial
era was characterized as a hierarchical one in which the unequals were ‘integrated into a system
of reciprocal relations’. Underlying this hierarchical system was the Confucian idea of harmony
or universal community (da tong) whereby the seniors bestowed benevolence from above while
the junior members exercised obedience from below (Chan 1999). The Westphalian world order
was also hierarchical in nature. On the one hand, it recognized equal legal status of the
‘civilized’ sovereign states in Europe; on the other, it legitimized the expansion of the ‘civilized’
European system into the ‘uncivilized’ non-European world by force (Jackson 1999, Suzuki


































2004). China began to be internalized into such a state-centric, realpolitik world order in the
mid-nineteenth century when it suffered from humiliating defeats at the hands of the Western
and Japanese powers, which forcefully brought China into the Westphalian international
system and subjected it to the principle of ‘extraterritoriality’ (Spence 1990, pp. 158–160,
Suzuki 2004). Since then, Chinese leaders – both republican and communist – have steadfastly
maintained that the international system is composed of juridically independent and equal but
materially unequal states. Chinese perspectives on world order are thus informed by both its rela-
tive position in the order and its attempts to improve its relative position in it. China defines a just
world order not only in terms of anti-imperialism but also of a militarily and economically strong
China, showing ‘a mixture of victimology and aggrandizement’ (Mitter 2003, p. 221). When
rhetoric is translated into practice, China, by instinct, attaches primary importance to the
norms of national sovereignty and territorial integrity and peaceful coexistence among nation-
states, as epitomized in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. As observed by Samuel
Kim (1993), the ‘siege mentality’ was reactivated as soon as the CCP began to experience
internal and external legitimation crises in the late 1980s. The former was due to the military
crackdown on the pro-democracy student movement in 1989 and the latter was the consequence
of the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s. To
fend off the alleged attempts by foreign powers, notably the US, to change or ‘peacefully trans-
form’ its communist political system, China resorts to the Westphalian notion of world order,
notably the sanctity of the principle of non-intervention (Chan 1999, Men 2004).
Inherent tensions exist between China’s grave misgivings about the West’s intentions
towards the country and the view held by the Chinese leadership that increased enmeshment
with globalization remains the most viable way for China to modernize itself. A reaction is
what Cai Tuo (2004b, p. 58) explicitly sounds out: ‘the existing international order [is]
profoundly unjust.’ The Chinese view on global governance holds that the world economy is
highly unequal in the distributions of the fruits of development, resulting in a huge wealth
gap between the world’s rich and its poor (Shen 2001). This highly unequal world is also attribu-
table to the claim that the decision-making power in international institutions is tightly held by
the developed world (People’s Daily Online 2000). China, therefore, calls for a democratization
of international relations as a way to remedy this problem. The measures to do so have, however,
not yet been spelt out in any detail by Chinese officials and scholars. But it would be a mistake to
equate this with the views in theWest that the world structure is undemocratic and that the devel-
opment of global civil society should be encouraged to deal with this democratic deficit at the
global level (Scholte 2005). This latter view is not shared by Chinese officials. China’s scepti-
cism of global civil society and for that matter most major INGOs derive partly from the fact that
they are dominated and controlled by the West. Also, for reasons that are apparent, China puts a
lot of hope on the role played by the UN, since it holds a veto power in the Security Council.
China’s influence in other major international organizations pales in comparison with its
status in the Security Council and the UN as a whole.
From perspectives to praxis: a China model in the making?
In defiance of the once-prevalent prediction of an imminent collapse of the Chinese economy
and political system in the wake of the Tiananmen crisis, China’s economic development
regained momentum in 1992 after registering a slow growth in 1989 and 1990. This gave rise
to the ‘China threat’ theory in the US and Japan (Deng 2006, pp. 191–195). To counter it,
China adopts a two-pronged strategy regarding its involvement in global governance. First, it
has largely abided by international norms and been party to all major international treaties



































responsible and benign rising power (Mitter 2003). Second, it has been proactively playing the
roles of protagonists at the international arena. Among its various new roles, the following ones
stand out (Pang 2006b):
. as a safeguard of the existing international order with an emphasis on maintaining the
central role of the United Nations;
. as a constructive critic of the unjust international rules and regimes by offering alternative
options for reforms, of which one proposal is to ‘democratize’ international relations; and
. as a leading force to foster the formation of regional communities, particularly in Asia.
It is said that what China now lacks is not a stance, but rather the capacity to exert widespread
influence and the experience of exercising its power skilfully. With the foregoing discussion of
the Chinese perspectives on global governance as the backdrop, the following paragraphs are
concerned with how China translates its perspectives into practice. The discussions surrounding
the ‘Beijing Consensus’ and Hu Jintao’s notion of a ‘harmonious world’ are illustrative and
deserve special attention.
‘Beijing consensus’ vs. ‘Washington consensus’?
As a result of successful economic reforms and a rise in hard power, it is not surprising to
presume that China would project its model of development and governance abroad, thus
presenting a challenge to the still dominant model advocated by such international financial
institutions as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, the White House,
Wall Street and the US Treasury, commonly known as the ‘Washington Consensus’ or
neo-liberal economic order. The Washington-based financial institutions portray themselves
as the ‘exclusive holders of legitimate knowledge about development’, leaving little room for
alternative paths for development. With little respect for the national sovereignty of the recipient
countries, they imposed uniform policy prescriptions onto Latin American, African and
Southeast Asian countries suffering from economic turmoils from the 1980s to the Asian
financial crisis of 1997–8, even though the indebted countries experienced economic problems
of a different nature (Weiss et al. 2004, p. 274, Thomas 2005).
In the wake of the demise of socialism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the
Washington-based financial institutions (and the UN) showed reduced tolerance of the
authoritarian or state-led models of economic growth in the Third World and in the former
socialist countries for their dismal performance. The effort for the Washington-based financial
institutions to promote good governance was aimed to address the dual problems of the unrepre-
sentativeness of corrupt governments and the inefficiency of non-market systems (Weiss et al.
2004, pp. 248–252). The concept of good governance is an extension of the Washington
Consensus with added emphases on the Western cultural values of the rule of law, transparency,
accountability and democracy.
These values, however, seem to matter little in China’s success story. Joshua Cooper Ramo
(2004) summarizes China’s success as the ‘Beijing Consensus’ and frequently compares it with
the Washington Consensus. According to Ramo, the Beijing Consensus is characterized by three
features: economic growth is led by innovations; development has to be balanced and
sustainable; and more importantly, China’s path to development is a quest for self-
determination, without copying blueprints for economic development from any country.
However, the term ‘Beijing Consensus’ does not acquire widespread approval and accord
among Chinese scholars, who prefer to use ‘China model’ in their discourse. They argue that
consensus is normally understood as an ‘ideal model’ which other states can recognize and
promote. By contrast, the China model refers to a model which tells others about China’s


































experience for development. Over the past three decades, China has developed its own path of
development, including the notion of ‘socialist modernization with Chinese characteristics’
since the 1980s. This can be claimed as a strategic policy for development or ‘a model for gov-
ernance’ under the opportunities and challenges of globalization. Other countries might develop
their own ways with reference to China’s experience, but the China model cannot be treated as a
consensus or universal blueprint for others to follow (Yu 2006b, Yu et al. 2006).
Akin to Ramo, Randall Peerenboom (2007, pp. 4–10) asks whether China presents a new
paradigm for developing states. The China model favours a gradual undertaking of economic
reforms led by the state instead of a big-bang shock therapy. By attaching significance to
self-determination and national sovereignty, it defies the policy prescriptions handed down
from the IMF, the World Bank as well as governments in the West. It is worth noting that
Chinese analysts only disagree with Ramo over a different use of terminology to sum up
China’s experience. By and large, they resonate with Ramo by putting emphasis on the
claims that the state should play a predominant role in reform and development. They also
point out that there should not be any universal blueprint for development imposed by external
actors from above (Zhao 2004, Zhang and Huang 2005).
Following on from the idea of the Beijing Consensus and the succeeding notion of the China
model, Chinese leaders began to realize the increasing importance of ‘soft power’ inworld affairs.
In early 2004 the CCP Central Committee promulgated the ‘Opinions of the CCP Central Com-
mittee on Further Developing andBringing about Flourishing Philosophy and Social Sciences’. In
May of the same year, members of the CCP Politburo gathered to study the building of China’s
soft power in the context of the debates about the Central Committee document as well as the
Beijing Consensus/China model (Yang 2006). Accordingly, the promotion of China’s develop-
ment model is argued to be a viable measure for China to build up its soft power. At the core of the
China model are the values of economic development, social stability and harmony (Y. Chen
2007). Treating the Beijing Consensus/China model as a major component of its soft power,
Beijing began to make a spate of diplomatic forays into the developing world, particularly in
Africa, in a bid to win more friends and allies to counter the predominance of Washington.
With rising criticisms of the Washington Consensus, the discourse on Beijing Consensus/
China model serves to enhance the voice of developing nations in global affairs.
An issue that could have far-reaching effects on global governance is whether Beijing is
proactively promoting an international order that is at odds with the West by strengthening
economic ties with and extending its normative influence to developing countries. Naazneen
Barma and Ely Ratner of the University of California at Berkeley assert that the China model,
which combines illiberal capitalism and illiberal sovereignty, ‘could set scores of developing
nations away from the path of liberal democracy, creating a community of countries that reject
Western views of human rights and accepted standards of national governance’ (Barma and
Ratner 2006, p. 57). Indeed, for the leaders of the developing world, China’s soft power lies in
its espousal of the doctrine of non-intervention in domestic affairs, the provision of ‘no-
strings-attached’ financial and technical aid – including health diplomacy (Thompson 2005) –
to Third World countries, the expansion of commercial opportunities, and the ability of the
CCP to sustain rapid economic growth under an authoritarian regime. For example, Angola
has found China ‘a more supportive and less critical partner’ than the International Monetary
Fund (Reed 2006). Nigeria’s Olusegun Obasanjo has been quoted as saying that the twenty-
first century is ‘the century for China to lead the world’ and ‘when you [i.e. China] are leading
the world, we want to be close behind you’ (cited in Alden 2007, pp. 68–69). Iran reportedly
looks to China for ways to enliven the economy without losing political power (Higgins 2007).
The appeal of the China model is, however, constrained by the fact that Chinese values and



































and accountability of political elites to the people, respect for human rights and ecological
balance. The former president of the World Bank, Paul Wolfowitz, had pointed out that
China and its big banks had not yet subscribed to the ‘Equator Principles’. As a voluntary
code of conduct, launched in 2003, the principles are designed to introduce good corporate gov-
ernance by pledging that private bank-financed projects should meet certain human rights and
environmental standards (Crouigneau and Hiault 2006, Wolfowitz 2006). The West is also prod-
ding China into supporting the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which aims to
strengthen transparency and accountability – in short, good governance – in resource-rich
countries through ‘the full publication and verification of company payments and government
revenues from oil, gas and mining’ (cited in Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
2005, Gill et al. 2007, pp. 19–20, Malloch-Brown 2007). China’s robust economic growth is
achieved at the expense of income equality and the environment. Political and legal reforms
in the direction of promoting democracy and the rule of law lag far behind economic transform-
ation. That is why even when American reputation and soft-power influence in liberal
democratic countries is on the wane as a result of its unilateral actions in Iraq and elsewhere,
China’s endeavours to build up soft power do not advance much in the West, global civil
society and democrats in the developing world (Kurlantzick 2005, Gill and Huang 2006).
A pluralist ‘harmonious world’
Following the Fourth Plenum of the 16th CCP Central Committee, held in Beijing in September
2004, which proposed, among other things, the building of a ‘harmonious socialist society’ in
China, China began to expound on the concept of a ‘harmonious world’ (hexie shijie), culminat-
ing in Hu Jintao’s address to the United Nations 60th Anniversary Summit in September 2005
(Hu 2005, Jiang 2005, Tang 2005, Wang and Yin 2006). It is said that the new notion represents
China’s overall goal and theory of global governance (Lu 2006, Pang 2006a, Yu 2007).
A harmonious world is to be built on a world composed of sovereign nation-states that
respect a plurality and diversity of cultures, ideologies and politico-economic systems and
handle their relations on the basis of ‘respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well
as respect for countries’ right to independently choose their own social systems and paths of
development’ (Hu 2005).
Based on the official doctrine, both Lu Xiaohong (2006) of China Foreign Affairs University
and Yu Keping (2007) expound on the Chinese perspective on global governance. For them, the
principal actors in global governance are nation-states and the United Nations. From this point of
view, the idea of a harmonious world shares the same logic of the Westphalian international
system. China’s advocate for strengthening the United Nations-based multilateralism and
constructing a harmonious world is obviously targeted at the hegemonic role of the US and
its neo-conservative mission to transform the prevailing Westphalian international system
into a self-proclaimed ‘more peaceful’ world based on the solidarist values of liberty, human
rights and democracy. On a theoretical level, the Chinese notion bears a resemblance to the
English School’s pluralist conception of international society, in which sovereign states can
maintain international order, in spite of the fact that they hold varying conceptions of human
rights and global justice (Linklater 2005).
By emphasizing the right of all states to choose their own paths of development while inte-
grating itself into the global polity and economy, China, on the one hand, rejects a liberal
political order imposed from the outside and, on the other hand, tries to develop and exercise
soft power in dealing with global issues that require multilateral cooperation as well as recruiting
support from developing countries. One can argue that key to the Chinese approach to global
governance is for the state actor to use power softly in a multilateral setting. To avoid a


































frontal attack on Washington, Beijing is careful to use soft balancing to counter US interests
(Z. Chen 2007). Its reservation about using the term ‘Beijing Consensus’ is part of a strategy
to avoid being seen as challenging the Washington Consensus directly. On the international
level, it uses multilateralism and reciprocal engagement to offset against American hegemonic
influence. In view of the changing norms of national sovereignty and role of the nation-state in
global governance, China promotes the notion of a harmonious world which upholds the
principle of non-intervention and stresses the predominant role of the state in governance.
Conclusion
One can summarise Chinese perspective on global governance by addressing the questions as to
who makes the rules of governance, how, in whose interests and for what ends? China’s
approach to global governance remains fundamentally state-centric. It has developed a view
of governance that posits that international order is to be produced and shaped by dominant
states, with non-state actors playing at best epiphenomenal roles. Among many voices about
China’s approach to global governance, a highly consistent theme, which constitutes the core
of the mainstream perspective, is their serious concern about the ulterior motives of the
Western efforts to promote global governance. Wary of the possible loss of the country’s
national sovereignty, the Chinese view tends to attach significance to intergovernmental
organizations, while admitting a multiplicity of actors, in managing global issues. Its embrace
of multilateralism and grudging inclusion of non-state actors is better understood as part of
its adaptive realpolitik strategy to reap the material benefits of economic globalization and to
hedge against the US-dominated global governance in a non-adversarial way. China’s rationalist
conception of global governance prompts it to deal with globalization and its impact by
participating in multilateral institutions and by seeking to adhere as far as possible to the
underlying norms and rules of the institutions. Benefits accruing to the country from increased
membership of the institutions are believed to outweigh the costs involved. Displaying signs of
greater flexibility in dealing with rule making in the economic realm notwithstanding, the
Chinese notion of national sovereignty insists on the principle of formal equality of states and
the ‘endowed’ rights to non-intervention in internal affairs. Only very recently did the
concept of responsibility to protect enter the Chinese discourse on sovereignty. The new
thinking has not yet been reflected in any observable changes in its national policy. Under the
ingrained influence of the Westphalian conception of sovereignty as well as the concern
about the association between the promotion of good governance and the building of a pro-
West liberal political order, China refrains from basing its offer of aid and loans to Third
World countries on the condition that liberal reforms are to be undertaken. In sum, China
perceives global governance as an international means to building an inclusive international
society in which nation-states of diverse cultures, ideologies and politico-economic systems
can coexist in peace and harmony. Behind a fac¸ade of deepening participation, China does
not share much of the fundamental norms and rules underpinning global governance with the
West. One may note two implications of this.
First, a formidable challenge to China’s aspiration to be a responsible great power is that its
statist conception of the rules and values governing the management and resolution of global
problems clashes with the emerging international norms of human security and individual
autonomy. Due to their dynamic interactions with international organizations and global civil
society, Western powerful countries’ conception of global issues is always ever changing,
their view of sovereignty is becoming contingent on certain conditions and a new sovereignty
game is in the making (Mallaby 2007). In contrast, without an equally heavy engagement



































accused of intransigence, resisting to respond to global crises proactively and innovatively.
Since its founding, the People’s Republic of China has firmly clung to the Westphalian con-
ception of international politics, which looks increasingly anachronistic in the current
globalizing era. Its agenda-setting power is undermined by its inability to propose creative
alternatives to the American and European preferences. China faces a daunting challenge, as
Rosemary Foot (2001) says that as soon as China begins to be aware of the need to increase
its integration into the international system, the criteria of membership in the club of the
responsible states has changed from pluralist concepts that emphasize respect for national
sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states to solidarist concepts
that rest on notions of common values and democratic governance.
Another implication is that as soon as China feels confident enough that it is a great power, it
may no longer feel totally obliged to comply with the established norms and rules of the
West-dominated international institutions. Its intentions to bend the rules if feasible are evident
from its criticisms of the injustices of the prevailing international order and its advocacy for a
democratization of international relations. Tensions rise overwho can legitimately definewhat con-
stitutes the dominant norms of the day that guide global governance and international order.What is
at issue is whether China can harness considerable soft power to modify the norms to its favour.
As Joseph Nye (2004, p. 31) has observed, politics ‘becomes in part a competition for
attractiveness, legitimacy, and credibility’. To slightly paraphrase the provocative question
raised by Gerald Segal (1999), we may ask: can China lead the world? The preceding analysis
tends to lead us to believe that it is less likely, at least in the foreseeable future. In order not to
play the part of the villain in global politics, China has to either occupy the moral high ground by
performing the role of norm entrepreneur or to follow in the West’s footsteps in understanding,
making and enforcing new rules and principles. Both options require the country and its analysts
to devote more resources to research into both global issues and global governance and more
importantly to deepen their engagement with a broadened array of actors in the world. They
have no alternative but to accept that the institution of the state is undergoing transformation
and contemporary globalization expedites this change.
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